* I will assume for the time being that an
illness not resulting in death in the usual case would not have produced the
current lockdown, although given the media’s panicked reporting, I’m not
entirely sure about that. So I will
focus on deaths while understanding that non-fatal infections also cause pain
to victims and the healthcare system.
To
ask the question may seem cold-blooded. Assumption
#2 contains the subassumption that the damage to the economy and the population
at large from a near-full shutdown of indefinite duration, which is where
we seem to be heading at this writing, would be catastrophic: At a
minimum a classic deep depression, this time around possibly accompanied by
social unrest and even violence in a population unaccustomed to privation and
full of confidence about its "rights." Is this assumption
correct? If it is not, you may stop reading now. There
is at least the strong possibility that the currently contemplated
measures would yield a national condition that is itself very bad, so
bad that it is at least worth thinking about how it balances with the deaths to
be expected from the contagion. So let’s
think about it.
As
of today, the numbers provided by reputable websites (Johns Hopkins among them)
yield about the same U.S. death rate:
2.7% (8,098/297,575). For
seasonal flu, it is much less than 1%.
Worldwide, the CV-19 death rate is about 5.4%, depending on what you
think about the accuracy of foreign (e.g., Chinese) reporting.
The
R0 (number of persons estimated to be infected by an infected person) is
unknown with precision, but since it is certainly greater than 1, the disease
can be expected to spread – it won’t die out naturally. The number most recently seen is about 2.5,
which is higher than regular flu. The
thing is highly infectious; it isn’t going to go away on its own, and it is
more lethal than regular flu.
Current forecasts of deaths in the United
States under these circumstances vary.
In February, the Centers for Disease Control ran a series of scenarios
and came up with an unhelpful estimate of from 200,000 to 1.7 million deaths.* The same article quotes another expert as
estimating 480,000 deaths.
It
is hard to know what to make of these estimates. “At the outset of the H1N1 swine flu outbreak
in 2009, President Obama’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
predicted that the virus would result in 900,000 to 1.8 million
hospitalizations and 30,000 to 90,000 deaths. Actual figures a year later were to
be 274,000 hospitalizations and 12,000 deaths.”
Which
is what makes essays like this fatuous.
I have no idea how many U.S. deaths to expect. A lot.
And a crushing burden to the healthcare system.
It
is no comfort to compare The Contagion to seasonal flu. The sites I have visited estimate this year’s
influenza A and B death toll to be anywhere from the low- to mid-five
figures. And the health system is
already equipped to handle those.
At
first blush, one might conclude: Based
on current estimates and our current understanding of the disease, CV-19 is
much more deadly than seasonal flu and justifies the economy-depressing
measures being taken.
But
let’s come at this from a slightly different angle. Consider the infection rates upon which the worst-case scenarios are
based – the ones that have stopped us all down:
Those February CDC scenarios I cited above assume the infection of between
160 to 214 million people. (Fatuity
alert: I don’t know if those numbers
take any degree of any of the current preventive measures into account.) The current population of the U.S. is 330
million. The estimate assumes that
half to about 65% of the citizenry will be infected. According to an article posted a couple of
days ago reporting on a late-March article from Lancet Infectious Diseases,
the infection rate is about 50% (again, effects of prophylactic measures
unknown).
Which
would lead me to ask the experts I assembled in the first paragraph of this
essay the following question: How would
the infection rate differ if we (1) had no restrictions of any kind in place,
or (2) allowed a substantial but not total resumption of normal economic
activity? Would it be a whole lot worse
than 50-65%?
The
question is: Would it be so much
worse that the increase in deaths justifies the shutdown of the American
economy with its attendant miseries, including health-related problems,
possible civil unrest, and, quite probably, an increase in non-CV-19 deaths?*
* I won’t get into the question of who is
most at risk here – who is more likely to die.
I’m assuming that the lives of elderly and health-compromised persons
who are at greater risk are of equal value to those of younger or healthy
persons (who are at some risk themselves).
The
revival of the economy would not have to be total. Here’s a suggested half-measure program:
Keep
schools closed.
Maintain
the moratorium on organized sporting activities, including professional sports.
Maintain
a moratorium on stadium-auditorium-theater entertainment.
Permit
all other economic activity, including restaurants, and all retail, all
manufacturing, supply, and service activity; that is, it is voluntary.
Where
feasible, require social distancing as many grocery stores are now doing.
Require
masking for certain activities, perhaps most activities; perhaps something
close to all-mask-all-the-time when one leaves one’s residence for any purpose (you can unmask to eat),
including employment.
Pass
laws necessary to assure that all persons who do not self-quarantine, and all
persons choosing to work for employers that choose to do business, assume the
risk of infection; that is, all civil liability for transmitting the disease is
eliminated except for intentional transmission.
I would also protect employers and merchants from civil rights suits for
excluding symptomatic persons from the workplace or establishments (unless
pretextual to disguise forbidden discrimination).
The analysis becomes, crudely:
Projected
infection rate from liberalization of economic activity minus current infection
rate, times 330 million, times 2.5% = estimated number of additional
deaths. Crudely, because, among many other
imponderables, that 2.5% might go up as the strain on the healthcare system
increases.
But
you’re not done, because you have to assume that the vast depression that would
result from the full-measure shutdown would cause a certain number of deaths
that will now be avoided.
But
you’re still not done, because the revival of the economy (to the extent
permitted with the foregoing half-measure proposal) will bring with it other
benefits: economical, psychological,
governmental, hedonic, maybe even spiritual, while we all take a deep breath
and gut out the higher mortality rate from CV-19 during the half-measure phase. (And don't forget that we need to check the assumption that a shutdown would be the disaster I'm assuming.)*
* Remember:
all models are suspect. Dr.
Fauci: "There are things called
models, and when someone creates a model, they put in various assumptions. And
the model is only as good and as accurate as your assumptions," he said.
"And whenever the modelers come in, they give a worst-case scenario and a
best-case scenario. Generally, the reality is somewhere in the middle. I've never
seen a model of the diseases that I've dealt with where the worst-case scenario
actually came out. They always overshoot."
So
if you are thinking carefully about the full shutdown that seems to be
approaching, you are comparing:
a numerically
large, percentage-wise small, number of human lives
with
certain hardship,
sometimes severe, sometimes fatal, for close to 100% of millions that will
likely outlast the pandemic.
I
state that prejudicially, but I acknowledge that it is a very hard choice
because human life is very, very valuable.
But the choice should be considered.
As noted, people much smarter and better-informed and devoted than I
sitting in my compression shorts and rash shirt for a few hours on a Saturday
afternoon might usefully do the arithmetic and sound much less fatuous
reporting on it.
And, by the way, if my numbers are wrong -- what are the right ones? If the current projections are not as dire as reported, then how less dire are they, and how does that change the lockdown analysis? If the infection rate is more dire, doesn't that shift the analysis toward easing, rather than intensifying, the lockdown? Whatever the numbers are, the question remains the same: Is the death-delta from coercive-lockdown versus something-considerably-less-than-coercive-lockdown an acceptable price for the potentially huge damage to the economy and social order?
Too
cold-blooded for you? Come see me in a
month. If you can find a sitter.